The Russian Roulette? Risks in Energy Investment Disputes in the Russian Federation by Turksen, Umut
 The Russian Roulette? Risks in Energy 





Published PDF deposited in Coventry University repository  
 
Original citation:  
Turksen, U. (2016) The Russian Roulette? Risks in Energy Investment Disputes in the Russian 




MARIS/OIS, OGEL & TDM Publisher 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright 
owners. A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively 
from without first obtaining permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The 
content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium 
without the formal permission of the copyright holders. 
 
The Russian Roulette? Risks in Energy








OGEL (Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence): Focusing on recent 
developments in the area of oil-gas-energy law, regulation, 
treaties, judicial and arbitral cases, voluntary guidelines, tax 
and contracting, including the oil-gas-energy geopolitics. 
 
For  full Terms & Conditions and subscription rates, please visit 
our website at www.ogel.org. 
 
Open to all to read and to contribute 
 
OGEL has become the hub of a global professional and 
academic network. Therefore we invite all those with an 
interest in oil-gas-energy law and regulation to contribute. We 
are looking mainly for short comments on recent 
developments of broad interest. We would like where possible 
for such comments to be backed-up by provision of in-depth 
notes and articles (which we will be published in our 
'knowledge bank') and primary legal and regulatory materials.  
 
Please contact us at info@ogel.org if you would like to 
participate in this global network: we are ready to publish 
relevant and quality contributions with name, photo, and brief 
biographical description - but we will also accept anonymous 
ones where there is a good reason. We do not expect 
contributors to produce long academic articles (though we 
publish a select number of academic studies either as an 
advance version or an OGEL-focused republication), but 
rather concise comments from the author's professional 
’workshop’. 
 
OGEL is linked to OGELFORUM, a place for discussion, sharing 
of insights and intelligence, of relevant issues related in a 
significant way to oil, gas and energy issues: Policy, legislation, 








Terms & Conditions 
 
Registered OGEL users are authorised to download and print 
one copy of the articles in the OGEL Website for personal, 
non-commercial use provided all printouts clearly include the 
name of the author and of OGEL. The work so downloaded 
must not be modified. Copies downloaded must not be 
further circulated. Each individual wishing to download a 
copy must first register with the website.  
 
All other use including copying, distribution, retransmission or 
modification of the information or materials contained herein 
without the express written consent of OGEL is strictly 
prohibited. Should the user contravene these conditions 
OGEL reserve the right to send a bill for the unauthorised 
use to the person or persons engaging in such unauthorised 
use. The bill will charge to the unauthorised user a sum 
which takes into account the copyright fee and administrative 
costs of identifying and pursuing the unauthorised user. 
 
For more information about the Terms & Conditions visit 
www.ogel.org 
 
© Copyright OGEL 2016 
OGEL Cover v2.8 
       
          Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence 
 
 






























































Issue : Vol. 14 - issue 4 





The Russian Roulette? Risks in Energy Investment Disputes in 
the Russian Federation 
Dr. Umut Turksen1  
Abstract 
The Russian Federation (Russia) has not managed to improve its investment environment 
effectively. The impetus of easing access to strategic industries for foreign investors and 
improving its domestic legal regime have not reached its full potential either. The on-going 
geo-political and geo-economic conflicts in and around Russia as well as the uncertain 
investor protection regime coupled with a general lack of rule of law in Russia contribute to 
this trend. As a consequence there is a growing discontent about the investor-state dispute 
settlement involving bilateral investment treaties to which Russia is a party. Firstly, this 
article considers the recent developments in investor-state disputes with specific reference to 
the use or the lack of most favoured nation (MFN) status and other remedial avenues. 
Secondly, it critiques the provisional application of ‘un-ratified’ treaties by particular 
reference to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), 1994. Finally, it provides a critique of the 
enforcement of arbitration awards in Russia in light of the on-going legal reform initiatives 
in Russia.  
It is concluded that MFN treatment is widely accepted yet its application depends on specific 
provision/s of the BIT thus varies widely. The paper employs case studies pertaining to 
disputes involving the ECT to demonstrate that there are various pitfalls inherent in the ECT. 
These include issues of jurisdiction, time and enforcement of awards. While there is evidence 
that the Russian Courts’ application of international conventions on the enforcement of 
foreign commercial arbitration awards does appear to be improving, the Russian 
Government has not always heeded to such determinations nor provided an effective and/or a 
meaningful remedy. Moreover, the recent legislative changes may signify slow deterioration 
of the Russian judicial system with regards to investment disputes.  
Introduction 
With the surge of bilateral investment treaties (BITs),2 the traditional methods of dispute 
resolution based on custom and/or power politics have been reduced amongst liberal 
democracies around the world. Most BITs provide substantive and procedural safeguards for 
investors thus limit sovereign interference and ensure legal redress if necessary. 3  
Nevertheless, national interests, domestic politics and geopolitics can still interfere with the 
security of the investment. Accordingly, there is a need to settle such disputes by independent 
and credible institutions (e.g. international arbitration, World Trade Organisation, Court of 
                                                            
1  Dr Umut Turksen, Professor of Law & Business, Kingston University, London and executive of the 
Commonwealth Legal Education Association. E-mail: U.Turksen@kingston.ac.uk  
2  There are nearly 3000 BITs worldwide. See, UNCTAD, World Investment Report 2015, p. 106, 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2015_en.pdf. 
3 Egli G., Don’t get bit: Addressing ICSID's Inconsistent Application of Most- Favored-Nation Clauses to 
Dispute Resolution Provisions, (2006-2007) Pepperdine Law Review, Vol. 34, 1045. 
 2 
Justice for the European Union, etc). While each BIT is unique, they evidence remarkable 
similarities4 in terms of the legal redress and remedies they offer to investors.  
Such provisions derive from a number of common principles found in the BITs. BITs 
generally stipulate a guarantee that investors will receive adequate legal remedy (i.e. 
compensation) if their property is expropriated. Secondly, BITs often prohibit the contracting 
states from hindering the free flow of capital by enacting currency controls.5 It is also often 
the case that BITs prohibit the host state from discriminating on the basis of nationality (e.g. 
principles of national treatment and MFN status) and require the host state to treat investors 
fairly and equitably in accordance with customary international law. 6  
While BITs contain numerous substantive rights for investors and investments, they would be 
deemed ineffective without corresponding procedural rights, which confer direct remedies for 
investors. Accordingly, BITs allow investors to pursue their claims through international or 
domestic judicial mechanisms. However, although BITs often allow investors to pursue legal 
redress via litigation in the host state’s legal system, this option is rarely used particularly in 
jurisdictions which lack rule of law, legal certainty and efficiency. Hence, investors often turn 
to arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution method.  
Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of arbitration depends largely on whether the applicant, if 
successful, can enforce its claims and subsequent remedies against the respondent.7 Robust 
legal systems in which such reassurances and rights can be relied on contribute to a sound 
investment environment and increase economic growth.8   
                                                            
4 Franck D. S., The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing Public International Law 
Through Inconsistent Decisions, (2005) Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, 1521. 
5 Sullivan N. P., Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand 
Bargain, (2005) Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 46, 67. 
6 Supra note, Franck, 1530-32.  
7  Nmehielle V., Enforcing Arbitration Awards Under the International Convention for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention), (2001) Annual Survey of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 7, 
21. Note that Article 54(1) of the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1965 
provides that “Each Contracting State shall recognize an award rendered pursuant to this Convention as binding 
and enforce the pecuniary obligations imposed by that award within its territories as if it were a final judgment 
of a court in that State. A Contracting State with a federal constitution may enforce such an award in or through 
its federal courts and may provide that such courts shall treat the award as if it were a final judgment of the 
courts of a constituent state”. On the other hand, Article 55 contains the following exemption: "Nothing in 
Article 54 shall be construed as derogating from the law in force in any Contracting State relating to immunity 
of that State or of any foreign State from execution...” Accordingly, this provision creates a loophole in favour 
of states party to a dispute. Egli opines that despite this loophole, execution of awards remains the rule rather 
than the exception. Supra note, Egli, at 1063.  
8 A number of studies have found that legal certainty, democratic governance, rule of law have a positive impact 
on investment and economic growth. See for example, Franck S., Foreign Direct Investment, Investment Treaty 
Arbitration, and the Rule of Law, (2006) Pacific McGeorge Global Bussiness and Development Law Journal, 
Vol. 19, 337; Li Q. and Resnick A., Reversal of Fortunes: Democratic Institutions and Foreign Direct 
Investment Inflows to Developing Countries, (2003) International Organisation, Vol. 57, Issue 1, 175; Lerner J. 
and Schoar A., Does Legal Enforcement Affect Financial Transactions? The Contractual Channel in Private 
Equity, (2005) The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 120, No. 1, 223; Haggard S. et al., The Rule of Law 
and Economic Development, (2008) Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 11, 205; and Joffé G., Foreign 




With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Russia Federation (Russia) sought to 
attract foreign investment to support its economic restructuring and development. 9  The 
Russian Government swiftly adopted a new model BIT in 1992. This initial framework 
offered fundamental improvement in comparison to the previous Soviet model, particularly 
by conferring to investors the right to arbitrate their disputes and invoke the rights granted 
under the treaty. However, a new model BIT adopted by Russia in 2001 excised a number of 
fundamental legal protection provisions, including national treatment, MFN treatment and 
fair and equitable treatment. 10  Subsequent BIT negotiations resulted in a variety of 
provisions; with some BITs recognising the right to legal protection whilst others do not. This 
inconsistency has hindered Russia’s ability to enhance its investment climate despite a 
number of significant steps in liberalizing its economy.11 Furthermore, the impetus of easing 
access to strategic industries for foreign investors and improving its domestic legal regime 
has not reached its full potential owing to the on-going socio-political conflicts in and around 
Russia as well as the uncertain investor protection regime, rife corruption12 and a general lack 
of rule of law in Russia.13 It can be argued that the rule of law is not only problematic in 
Russia’s external trade relations but also in its domestic sphere.14 For example, by utilising 
the military, law enforcement, and security agencies (also known as the siloviki), the Russian 
bureaucratic elite achieved the de facto nationalization of YUKOS (the largest oil company in 
Russia) while securing the imprisonment of its former owners.15 Such takeovers are a result 
of political rivalries and evidence of the importance of strategic nationalism in Russian 
government’s “decision to intervene into the corporate control structures”.16 It has also been 
reported that judges (who are financially dependent on local governments) favour local 
companies over foreigners.17 As a consequence there has been a growing discontent and 
mistrust about the investor-state dispute settlement involving bilateral investment treaties to 
                                                            
9 Aris S., Russia’s Approach to Multilateral Cooperation in the Post Soviet Space: CSTO, EurAcEC, and SCO, 
(2010) Russian Analytical Digest, No. 76, 1, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-76.pdf.  
10 Luz M., New Model Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Step Backwards for Foreign Investors, Russian/East 
European Business & Finance Report, 15 October 2001.  
11 For example, Russia joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on 22 August 2012 with specific schedule 
of commitments that are supposed to open its market to foreign investment and businesses. 
http://www.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/russia_e.htm.  
12  Russia ranks 119 out of 168 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Index, 2015, 
https://www.transparency.org/country/#RUS.  
13 Balcer A., ‘Corruption is not just endemic to the Russian system, it is the system. It is in the EU’s interest to 
increase its engagement with Russian society’, LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (07 Jun 
2012), http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46228/; See, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights pertaining 
to the European Convention on Human Rights to which the Russian Federation is a signatory: 
http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/EN/Header/Case-Law/Decisions+and+judgments/HUDOC+database/.  
14  Turksen U., ‘Euro-vision of Energy Trade with Russia: Current problems and future prospects for EU 
solidarity in energy trade’, (2014) Oil, Gas and Energy Law, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 34.  
15 Yakovlev A., In Search for a New Social Base or Why the Russian Authorities Are Changing Their Relations 
with Business By, Russian Analytical Digest, 21 Dec. 2012, No.121, p. 10. For a list of nationalization 
transactions in Russia between 2004 and 2008 see, Sprenger C., Does Nationalization Work? Evidence from 
Russian State Takeovers, European Financial Management Association, 05 January 2012, 
http://www.efmaefm.org/0EFMAMEETINGS/EFMA%20ANNUAL%20MEETINGS/2012-
Barcelona/papers/EFMA2012_0612_fullpaper.pdf.  
16 Chernykh L., Profit or politics? Understanding renationalizations in Russia, (2011) Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Vol. 17, Issue 5, 1237.  
17 See, Burger E. S., Corruption in the Russian Arbitrazh Courts: Will There Be Significant Progress in the Near 
Term?, (2004) International Law, Vol. 38, 15 and Glusker E., Arbitration Hurdles Facing Foreign Investors in 
Russia: Analysis of Present Issues and Implications, (2010) Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 
10, No. 3, p. 602.  
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which Russia is a party.18 It can be seen that both foreign and native investors prefer to take 
their disputes outside of Russia as the adjudicators in London’s High Court and the 
International Dispute Resolution Centre have seen a surge of disputes involving Russia.19 
Firstly, this article considers the recent developments in investor-state disputes with specific 
reference to the use of MFN status and other remedies. In doing so, it analyses scenarios in 
which an MFN obligation has risen. The article does not intend to discuss all of the MFN 
clauses contained in BITs. Rather, it confines itself to establishing the prospects for invoking 
MFN status pertaining to BITs involving Russia as the host state.  
Secondly, it critiques the provisional application of ‘un-ratified’ treaties by particular 
reference to the ECT as it is currently the only major multilateral treaty in the energy field in 
terms of investment protection with the largest geographical and country coverage.20 Finally, 
it provides a critique of the enforcement of arbitration awards in Russia. Given the 
uncertainty of the legal and political uncertainty in Russia, the paper explores whether 
invoking MFN treatment is feasible and if so, whether it would circumvent the risks posed to 
investors in Russia. It is concluded that MFN treatment is widely accepted yet its application 
depends on specific provision/s of the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) concerned. As a result 
of this inconsistency, a careful consideration must be given to the scope and nature of the 
MFN status in negotiations and drafting of investment agreements with Russia. The analysis 
also utilises disputes involving the ECT to demonstrate various pitfalls including issues of 
jurisdiction, time and enforcement of awards. While there is evidence that the Russian courts’ 
application of international conventions on the enforcement of foreign commercial arbitration 
awards has improved in recent years, the Russian Government has not always heeded to such 
determinations nor provided an effective remedy. The Russian Government’s strategy in 
curtailing proper enforcement and remedy has included exploitation of the inability of foreign 
creditors to enforce against state assets in Russia, making use of sovereign immunity rules in 
other countries and delaying payment of awards for years.21 
It is argued that in addition to creating a more predictable energy policy and regulation 
regime, the future of Russia depends on whether and to what extend the Russia can agree on 
and comply with rules of international trade22 and decisions of independent adjudicators. 
Given the current crisis involving Ukraine and Russia and the subsequent geopolitical 
decisions and sanctions influencing trade relations between Russia and its main trading 
partners (e.g. the European Union), it is difficult to foresee what the immediate future holds 
for investors and businesses operating in Russia. Yet, there could be a degree of success in 
mitigating risks in Russia if due consideration is given to recent legal developments.   
                                                            
18 “Most Russian BITs contain a dispute resolution clause limiting jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals to hear 
disputes over the fact of expropriation”. See, E. Gadelshina, Major Pitfalls for Foreign Investors in Russia: What 
Are Russian BITs Worth, 01 December 2011, Kluwer Arbitration Blog.  
19 Minaeva T., The enforcement of foreign judgments and arbitral awards in Russia, The Lawyer, January 2014. 
20 Konoplyanik A. and Wälde T., Energy Charter Treaty and its Role in International Energy, (2006) Journal of 
Energy and Natural Resources Law, Vol. 24, No. 24, 526. 
21 One of the most notorious and worst scenario cases in this regard is the Noga case, which took over two 
decades without success for the claimant. Noga faced intimidation by the Russian authorities and went bankrupt 
having spent $40 million in legal costs. Compagnie Noga D'importation et D'exportation S.A. v. The Russian 
Federation, Docket Nos. 02-9237(L), 02-9272(CON). 
22 Yakovlev A., In Search for a New Social Base or Why the Russian Authorities Are Changing Their Relations 
with Business, Russian Analytical Digest, 21 Dec. 2012, No.121, 10. Yakovlev opines that “Russia’s highest 
officials recognize that in order to preserve the political regime, it is necessary to change the model of relations 
with business. However, the lack of correct stimuli for bureaucrats at the middle level continues to be a serious 
obstacle for development”. 
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1. Can MFN be utilised as a remedy against expropriation?  
a. Problems with the BITs involving Russia  
It would be fair to say that the main objective of most BITs is the protection of investments 
made by investors.23 This however – as practice demonstrates – has not always been the case 
in BITs with Russia.  
Russia signed its first BIT with Finland in 1989 and has currently 73 BITs in place, 56 of 
which are in force. The remaining 17 have been signed but are not in force because they have 
not yet been ratified by Russia, other party or both.24 Several of the major Russian BITs with 
countries of Western Europe and further afield are surprisingly narrow in their scope and 
therefore offer very little legal protection to the foreign investors, including BITs with 
Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, Finland, Germany, Korea, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, 
and UK.25 The common denominator in these BITs is that the investors have no redress or 
legal remedy in general and are not entitled to instigate arbitration proceedings in particular, 
in relation to the expropriation of its investment by Russia. It is important to note that Article 
15(4) of the 1993 Russian Constitution provides that the principles and norms of international 
law and international treaties of the Russian Federation are an integral part of Russia’s legal 
system.26 This clearly creates a monist system27 in regards to incorporation of international 
legal instruments and their effect in domestic law, and may explain why Russia has always 
been reluctant to include and/or limited the scope of provisions for independent adjudication 
of trade disputes in its various international agreements.28 
 
For instance, under the Germany-Russia BIT, the investor is limited to arbitrate issues 
“relating to the amount of compensation or the method of its payment [...] or to freedom of 
transfer [...]”. 29  Incidentally, Germany is the second major source of foreign direct 
investment flow (FDI) to Russia.30 Likewise under the Netherlands-Russia BIT, an investor 
can only arbitrate “disputes concerning the amount or procedure of payment of compensation 
[...] or concerning the free transfer [...]“.31 The Netherlands is the third biggest contributor 
in terms of value of FDI flows to Russia.   
 
                                                            
23 For further discussion see: Juillard P., Bilateral investment treaties in the context of investment law, OECD: 
(http://www.oecd.org/investment/internationalinvestmentagreements/1894794.pdf).  
24  Investment Policy Hub (UNITED NATIONS UNCTAD), International Investment Agreements: 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/175#iiaInnerMenu. 
25 Rubins N. and Rubinina E., Global Arbitration Review - Overview of the Investment Treaty Program: Russia, 
10 September 2014; http://globalarbitrationreview.com/know-how/topics/66/jurisdictions/26/russia/.  
26  Butler W.E., “Russian Foreign Relations and Investment Law”, OUP 2006, p. 49; adoption of the 
international law without a need for its prior translation into the domestic legislation is termed “monist”, see: 
Morgan and Baker v Hinton Organics (Wessex) Ltd and CAJE [2009] EWCA Civ 107 CA. 
27 Jackson J., Status of treaties in domestic legal systems: A policy analysis, (1992) American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 86, No. 2, 302-340.  
28 Supra note, Turksen. 
29 Article 10(2) of Germany-Russia BIT. 
30 KPMG, Statistic from years 2007-2011; ‘Investing in Russia: An overview of the current investment climate 
in Russia’, April 2013: 
(https://www.kpmg.com/NL/nl/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/High-Growth-
Markets/Investing-in-Russia1.pdf)  
31 Art 9(2) of Netherlands-Russia BIT.  
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In one of the landmark cases, Vladimir Berschander and Moïse Berschander v Russia,32 the 
tribunal held that the claim for expropriation fell outside the scope of Russia-
Belgium/Luxemburg BIT allowing only for arbitration as to the amount of compensation and 
the method of payment.  
Similar wording may be found in a BIT between Russia and UK, Russia’s third biggest 
source of FDI. 33 It states that only the disputes “concerning the amount or payment of 
compensation [...], or concerning any other matter consequential upon an act of 
expropriation [...], or concerning the consequences of the-non implementation of [transfer 
provisions]” 34  may be referred to arbitration. In RosInvest, the tribunal confirmed the 
position taken in Berschander and held that the claim for expropriation fell outside of the 
scope of the UK-Russia BIT.35 It appears therefore that for German, Dutch, Belgian and UK 
investors, the only recourse for establishing the occurrence of expropriation would be to refer 
the dispute to the national judicial authorities in Russia, which is not often a satisfactory 
outcome.36 Since these BITs do not allow investors to arbitrate in the event of expropriation, 
their object and purpose are defeated. 37  This is a serious flaw in Russia’s approach to 
investment and present a great risk to investors. 
b. Trick or treat – MFN as a solution or bait?  
The most logical solution to overcome the shortcomings of certain Russian BITs may be to 
rely on an MFN clause. The MFN principles of non-discrimination, fair and equitable 
treatment of investors have long been considered as "the corner-stone of all modem 
commercial treaties," and are some of the fundamental principles of the contemporary 
multilateral trade systems such as the WTO regime38 and other regional (e.g. North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)) 39 and international trade agreements (e.g. Energy Charter 
Treaty).40 Rubins and Nazarov observe that the MFN clause found expression in a BIT in 
                                                            
32 (SCC Case No 080/2004, Award, 21 April 2006). 
33 Statistic from years 2007-2011; “Investing in Russia: An overview of the current investment climate in 
Russia”, April 2013, KPMG: 
(https://www.kpmg.com/NL/nl/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/PDF/High-Growth-
Markets/Investing-in-Russia1.pdf)  
34 Article 8(1) of the UK-Russia BIT. 
35 RosInvest Co UK Ltd v Russia (SCC Case No V 079/2005, Award, 12 September 2010), Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (SCC). 
36 For a detailed critical analysis of business disputes in Russia see, Hendley K., ‘Beyond the Tip of the Iceberg: 
Business Disputes in Russia’, in Murrel P (Eds), Assessing the value of law in transition economies, (UMP, 
2001) Ch. 2. 
37  Gadelshina E. R., Major Pitfalls for Foreign Investors in Russia: What Are Russian BITs Worth?, 01 
December 2011; http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/12/01/major-pitfalls-for-foreign-investors-in-
russia-what-are-russian-bits-worth/.  
38  Vesel S., Clearing a Path Through Tangled Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute 
Settlement Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, (2007) The Yale Journal of International Law, Vol. 32, 
125.  
39 Article 1102 of NAFTA, 1993 provides that “[e]ach Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment 
no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the 
establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of 
investments.” See for instance, Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v United Mexican States, ICSID Case No 
ARB(AF)/99/1 (awarding 10 million Mexican pesos to a US national under the North American Free Trade 
Agreement as compensation for Mexico’s failure to provide import tax rebates similar to those offered to 
Mexican businesses). 
40 Article 10 (1) of the ECT stipulates that “[e]ach Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of 
this Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors of other 
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1959, “when West Germany and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan signed the very first 
modern treaty on the encouragement and mutual protection of investments”.41 
In the ECT context, it is clear that fair and equitable treatment as well as constant security 
and protection are not confined to physical assets of the investor. They also encompass legal 
protection and procedural rights.42 Accordingly, any differential treatment must be reasonable 
and non-discriminatory. Addressing unreasonable measures, the International Court of Justice 
asserted that they are “not so much something opposed to a rule of law, as something 
opposed to the rule of law … a willful disregard of due process of law, an act which shocks, 
or at least surprises, a sense of judicial propriety”.43 In determining if a measure amounts to 
unreasonable discrimination (e.g. in violation of the principle of national treatment under 
Article 10(7) of the ECT), the tribunal in Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v 
Argentina opined that the standard question, which ought to be posed, is whether there has 
been “capricious, irrational or absurd differentiation”.44  
An analysis of the arbitration cases (particularly in the context of ECT)45 indicates that there 
are five elements which determine whether fair and equitable treatment exist:  
• transparency, stability and the protection of legitimate expectations; 
• compliance with contractual obligations; 
• procedural propriety and due process;46 
• good faith; and  
• freedom from coercion and harassment.47 
While the principles of fair and equitable treatment are closely related to the concept of 
‘treatment’ for the purposes of MFN status, they do not always overlap therefore may loose 
their potency.48 For example, on its face value, the application of Article 10 of the ECT49 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Contracting Parties to make Investments in its Area. Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all 
times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable treatment. Such Investments 
shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by 
unreasonable or discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal. In no case 
shall such Investments be accorded treatment less favourable than that required by international law, including 
treaty obligations. Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with an Investor or an 
Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party” (emphasis added). 
41 Rubin N and Nazarov A., Investment Treaties and the Russian Federation: Baiting the Bear?, (2008) Business 
Law International, Vol. 9. No. 2, 100.  
42 Azurix corporation v Argentina, Award, 14 July 2006, para. 408; ICSID CASE No. ARB/01/12. 
43 Case concerning Elettronica Sicula, 20 July 1989, (1989) 15 ICJ Rep. 76. 
44 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets LP v Argentina, Award, 22 May 2007, para. 282.  
45 For a detailed analysis of key disputes see, Kleinheisterkamp J., Investment Protection and EU Law: The 
Intra-and Extra-EU Dimension of the Energy Charter Treaty, (2012) Journal of International Economic Law, 15 
(1): 85 and Roe T and Happold M., Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty, (CUP, 
2011). For a full list of investment disputes under the ECT see, Energy Charter Secretariat, 
http://www.energycharter.org/what-we-do/dispute-settlement/investment-dispute-settlement-cases/.  
46 LG & E v Argentina, Decision on Liability, 03 October 2006.  
47 Roe T. and Happold M., Settlement of Investment Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty, (CUP, 2011) at 
112, citing Dolzer and Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law, (OUP, 2008).  
48 Ibid. pp. 120-130.  
49 Article 10(7) of the ECT stipulates the MFN status: “Each Contracting Party shall accord to Investments in its 
Area of Investors of other Contracting Parties, and their related activities including management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal, treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments of its own 
Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third state and their related activities 
including management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or disposal, whichever is the most favourable.” 
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seems to be limited by Article 26 of the ECT, which requires that any complaint be related to 
an investment. However, as aptly argued by Roe et al., interpretation of treaty provisions 
must be conducted holistically, whereby “interpretation must give meaning and effect to all 
the terms of a treaty”.50 Furthermore, in determining what is ‘fair and equitable’, the object 
and purpose of the ECT ought to be considered.51  
The MFN principle also finds expression in thousands of BITs52 thus can be considered as a 
fundamental principle of modern international economic law. However, unlike the 
convergence on and acceptance of a single MFN clause under the multilateral trading system 
of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), MFN clauses within various BITs are subject to a 
broad range of interpretations. An examination of the case law under the auspices of the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and further a field 
indicate divergent approaches and results on the question of whether an MFN clause can be 
relied on by an investor in order to invoke the dispute settlement provisions of a third party's 
treaty with the host state.53 This trend is somewhat surprising given the fact that many arbitral 
tribunals have referred to the WTO jurisprudence pertaining to MFN principle.54  
MFN clauses link investment agreements by ensuring that parties to one treaty provide 
treatment no less favorable than the treatment they provide investors under other treaties.55 
By including an MFN clause into the provisions of BITs, contracting parties seek to extend 
the application of benefits granted to nationals of third states to nationals of a contracting 
partner. MFN clauses normally contain the word “treatment” which may confer substantive 
and potential rights, privileges and/or concessions. These often come in the form tariff 
reductions and market access provisions and protections. Traditionally, national tariff 
schedules have generally extended MFN status beyond the BITs and/or multilateral trade 
agreements,56 except on political and security grounds.57 In determining whether MFN status 
                                                            
50 Supra note, Roe T. and Happold M. 
51 El Paso International Energy Co v Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, 27 April 2006, paras. 68-70.  
52 Fietta S., Most Favoured Nation Treatment and Dispute Resolution Under Bilateral Investment Treaties: A 
Turning Point? (2005) International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 8, 131. Alford asserts that “[a]lthough the 
national treatment tests embodied in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements differ from that in most 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs), both regimes are concerned with establishing rules to effectively regulate 
different forms of de facto or de jure discrimination”. Alford R., The Convergence of International Trade and 
Investment Arbitration, (2014) Santa Clara Journal of International Law, Vol. 12, 35.  
53 Ibid.  
54 For instance, in Pope & Talbot v. Canada, the arbitral tribunal analysed WTO jurisprudence and rejected the 
respondent State’s narrow definition of what constituted discriminatory treatment (Pope & Talbot Inc. v. 
Canada, NAFTA/UNICTRAL Trib., Award on Merits, 45-72 (Apr. 10, 2001), 
http://naftaclaims.com/Disputes/Canada/Pope/PopeFinalMeritsAward.pdf.  In Occidental v. Ecuador, the 
arbitral tribunal compared the text of the national treatment provision in the BIT with the text of the national 
treatment provision in the WTO (Occidental Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador, LCIA Case No. 
UN3467, Award, 173-177 (London Ct. Int'l Arb. 2004). For detailed analysis, see, supra note, Alford.  
55 Acconci P., ‘Most Favoured Nation Treatment and International Law on Foreign Investment’, in Muchlinski 
P., et al., (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law (OUP, 2008).  
56 This principle of “national treatment” (giving others the same treatment as one’s own nationals) is also found 
in all the three main WTO agreements (Article 3 of GATT, Article 17 of GATS and Article 3 of TRIPS) 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm and under the North American Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), 1992.  
57 For instance, the former communist countries were not granted MFN status by the United States. Contention 
arises as to whether the term “treatment” includes dispute resolution provisions. Subramanian A and Jin Wei S., 
The WTO promotes trade, strongly but unevenly, (2007) Journal of International Economics, 72(1), 151.  
 9 
can be invoked, arbitration decisions across the globe indicate that the ejusdem generis58 
principle shall be established first. 59  If the ejusdem generis is established, 60  then any 
substantive and/or procedural rights and obligations may be invoked. Consequently, in order 
to establish whether MFN status is available, a thorough analysis and interpretation of the 
relevant treaty provisions are necessary.61  
The ambiguity as to whether the MFN applies to dispute resolution provisions in Russian 
BITs, i.e. whether the approach in Maffezzini62 or in Plama63 (together with a strings of cases 
that follow them)64 is the preferred one, has been resolved by the Svea Court of Appeal in 
2013.65 The Svea Court annulled the award of Stockholm Chambers of Commerce arbitration 
in the dispute between RosInvestCo and the Russian Federation. At the first instance in 
RosInvest,66 it was held that the MFN provisions under UK-Russia BIT extended to dispute 
resolution; hence the RosInvest was able to bring a claim for expropriation under more 
favourable regime of Denmark-Russia BIT. By annulling this award, the Svea Court 
“confirmed” previous interpretation of non- applicability of MFN to dispute resolution 
preferred in the previous awards under Russian BITs.67 The Svea Court of Appeal opined that 
the MFN-protection for “investors” did not exists “regarding their management, maintenance, 
use, enjoyment or disposal of their investments” and the arbitral tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction to settle whether Russia had undertaken expropriation measures against 
RosInvest.68 The Svea Court reaffirmed the previous judgments on the subject matter, namely 
the decisions in Vladimir Berschader and Moïse Berschader v Russia.69  
    
                                                            
58 Meaning "of the same kind", the principle of ejusdem generis dictates where a legal provision lists specific 
classes of persons (i.e. investors) or things (i.e. goods) and then refers to them in general, the general statements 
only apply to the same kind of persons or things specifically listed. 
59 Gazzini T and Tanzi A., Handle with care: Umbrella clauses and MFN treatment in investment arbitration, 
(2013) The Journal of World Investment & Trade, Vol. 14, 978.  
60 This is often done by referring to an umbrella clause in a treaty. For example, Article II (2)(c) of the BIT 
between United States and Argentina provides that “[e]ach Party shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments”. For a detailed analysis of umbrella clauses in investment treaties see, 
supra note Gaazini Tanzi and also see, Weiler T. J., Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law, (Juris 
Publishing, 2008).  
61 This is done in light of the rules contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, 1969.   
62 Maffezini v Spain (ICSID Case No ARB/97/7) concluding that an MFN provision permitted an investor to 
take advantage of a more favorable procedural right in a different treaty. See also, Gas Natural SDG S.A. v 
Argentina, Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID No. ARB/03/10 (June 17, 2005); Siemens A.G. v Argentina, 
Decision on Jurisdiction, ICSID No. ARB/02/8 (August 03, 2004). For an overview of BITs conducted between 
Russia and other countries see: http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/175. 
63 Plama Consortium Limited v Bulgaria (ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 
2005) finding that an MFN provision could not be utilized to invoke a more favorable procedural right. 
64 For discussion on both approaches see: Fietta S., Most favoured nation treatment and dispute resolution under 
bilateral investment treaties: A turning point? (2005) International Arbitration Law Review, Vol. 8, 131. 
65 Judgment of 05 September 2013 – Svea HovR  T-10060-10: 
http://www.arbitration.sccinstitute.com/Views/Pages/GetFile.ashx?portalId=89&cat=95791&docId=1767458&p
ropId=1578.  
66 RosInvestCo UK Ltd v Russia (SCC Case No V 079/2005, Award, 12 September 2010), Stockholm Chamber 
of Commerce (SCC). 
67 Malinskaya R., ‘From Russia with Love: MFN Clauses Revisited’, Berwin Leighton Paisner, 21 May 2014, 
http://www.blplaw.com/expert-legal-insights/articles/russia-love-mfn-clauses-revisited/.   
68 Judgment of 05 September 2013 – Svea HovR  T-10060-10. 
69 (SCC Case No 080/2004, Award, 21 April 2006). 
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 In Berschader however, the way in which the arbitrators have approached the issue of the 
applicability of an MFN clause to dispute resolution had different connotations. The tribunal 
referred to the Maffezini, asserting that “an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not 
incorporate by reference to dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part set forth in 
another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic treaty leaves no doubt that the 
Contracting Parties intended to incorporate them.”70 Accordingly, the Berschader tribunal 
decided that there was no evidence of the Contracting Parties’ intention to that effect. The 
claimant under Belgium-Russia BIT was merely entitled to arbitrate the amount and method 
of payment on the narrow construction of the dispute resolution clause. The attempt to import 
broader dispute resolution provisions from Denmark-Russia BIT – which allowed for “any 
dispute in connection with an investment” – was unsuccessful and the tribunal held that MFN 
does not extend to the dispute resolution provisions.71 Subsequently, the claimant was left 
without a remedy for expropriation. 
This is a serious and a worrying outcome as investors are effectively denied the essence of 
protection that BIT sought to offer, namely protection and remedy against expropriation. The 
narrow interpretation of BIT provisions in both cases meant that “no claim over the amount 
or mode of payment may be entertained absent a national court decision on the occurrence of 
expropriation or an acknowledgement of the host state to that effect.”72 The option to apply 
an MFN clause to dispute resolution mechanism, which appears to have been a remedy 
against “faulty” construction of certain Russian BITs, was denied by both the tribunal and the 
Svea Court of Appeal whereby the Court accepted the Russian Federation’s appeal and set 
aside the SCC award.73 The Svea Court of Appeal held that the award was not conferred by a 
valid arbitration agreement thus the award of the tribunal was annulled. Such jurisprudence 
indicate that relying on an MFN clause to import more favourable dispute resolution 
provisions from other treaties into a BIT is not straight forward and at times impossible in the 
Russian context.   
c. Another solution – is the compensation due?  
Despite the reluctance to apply MFN status to include arbitration or adjudication, an 
alternative remedy has been suggested in Renta 4 SVSA et al v Russia.74 In rejecting the 
flawed restrictive construction, the Tribunal asserted that: “The Claimants allege 
expropriation. Russia denies any obligation under this head. There is therefore a dispute as 
to whether compensation is due”.75 Although the tribunal concluded that the MFN status 
under the Spain-Russia BIT does not extend to the dispute resolution provisions in other BITs 
to which Russia is a party, it abstained from the narrow interpretation of dispute resolution 
provisions (as in cases identified above) that limited the claimant to arbitrate the amount of 
the compensation and the method of payment. The tribunal affirmed the respondent’s 
argument of non-inclusion of the occurrence of expropriation in the arbitration scope under 
                                                            
70 Emilio Agustín Maffezini v. The Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7 - 
http://www.italaw.com/cases/641.  
71 Salomon C. and Friedrich S., ‘How most favoured nation clauses in bilateral investment treaties affect 
arbitration’, Practical Law, Thomson Reuters, 2013;  
http://uk.practicallaw.com/0-381-7466?source=relatedcontent.   
72  Gadelshina E. R., Major Pitfalls for Foreign Investors in Russia: What Are Russian BITs Worth?, 01 
December 2011; (http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/12/01/major-pitfalls-for-foreign-investors-in-
russia-what-are-russian-bits-worth/). 
73 Judgment of 05 September 2013 – Svea HovR  T-10060-10.  
74 SCC Case No V 024/2007, Award, 20 March 2009, http://www.italaw.com/documents/Renta.pdf.  
75 Ibid. 
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the Spain-Russia BIT by establishing that an act of taking is indeed a “predicate to any 
amount being due”. Thus, it held that the tribunal could assess whether any compensation is 
due to the claimant by the reason of respondent’s behaviour, without having to decide 
whether the expropriation or nationalisation has taken place.76 The arbitrators asserted, “the 
flaw in Russia’s argument is that there is more than one basis on which a respondent State 
could say “zero”: One might be indeed a divergence as to quantification; [a]nother could be a 
denial of any obligation on account of alleged expropriation. Such an obligation is the evident 
predicate to any amount being “due” and thus the object of the type of debate allowed under 
Article 10.”77 
It can be contended that common sense prevailed over formalistic approach in this case.78 It 
is not certain however, whether subsequent tribunals will follow this backdoor approach. 
These different practices illustrate that determination as to whether an MFN clause can be 
applied in arbitration proceedings will depend on the facts of each case and require detailed 
examination and interpretation of relevant legal instrument (e.g. BIT). While there is a chance 
that applicants may be able to invoke MFN status, the inconsistent approaches by Russia’s 
adjudicators do not provide legal certainty.  
 
2. Application of the Energy Charter Treaty, 1994 (ECT) 
 
There are generally three phases to concluding a treaty: signature, ratification, and entry into 
force.79 By signing a treaty, the signatories are not under a legal duty to ultimately ratify the 
treaty.80 It is a generally accepted principle of international law that treaties do not have legal 
effect before entry into force.81 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 (VCLT) 
codifies the main rules of treaty interpretation and application according to customary 
international law. Pursuant to Article 18, the VCLT provides that signatories (in good faith) 
must not take actions that would undermine the aim and purpose of a treaty, prior to 
ratification. Subsequently, the obligations and rights arising from of a treaty do not take effect 
until the treaty is ratified in accordance with the signatory state’s internal legal and 
constitutional arrangements. However, the situation is different with respect to the ECT 
because the ECT contains a specific provision dealing with the treaty’s provisional effect 
between signature and ratification period. Article 45(1) of the ECT states that “[e]ach 
signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry into force ... to the extent 
that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations”. 
The provisional application of a treaty helps to minimise the negative impact of actual and 
potential defection of the parties by obliging them to bear the costs of treaty obligations 
immediately at the time of signing. In other words, “signatories are induced to take on these 
                                                            
76 Iglesias J. et al., “Comments on the award on preliminary objections (Renta 4 S.V.S.A. et. al. v.  The Russian 
Federation), 20 March 2009 issued by the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce”.  
77 Ibid.  
78 Supra note, Gadelshina. 
79 Roucounas E., Uncertainties Regarding the Entry into Force of Some Multilateral Treaties, in Wellens K., 
(Eds.) International Law: Theory and Practice: Essays in Honour of Eric Suy (Kluwer,1998) cited in Niebruegge 
M., Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration and the Future Place of 
Provisional Application in International Law, (2007-2008) Chicago Journal of International Law, Vol. 8, 355.  
80 Rogoff M., The International Legal Obligations of Signatories to an Unratified Treaty, (1980) Maine Law 
Review, Vol. 32, 267. 
81 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), Articles 26, 24(1), 24(2), and 28. 
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obligations by gaining the ability to capture the full benefits of the treaty regime rather than 
only being able to capture the indirect benefits available to parties for whom the treaty has 
not entered into force”.82 
On 20 August 2009 Russia submitted a notice to the Energy Charter Secretariat stating that it 
no longer wished to be a party to the ECT and that it did not apply the treaty provisionally 
under Article 45(1) since such provisional application would have been inconsistent with the 
Russian Constitution, laws and regulations. 83  However, according to Article 45(3), the 
investments made prior to the termination of the provisional application will be protected for 
the period of 20 years from the termination. Shortly after Russia’s “withdrawal”, three 
interim awards on jurisdiction have been granted in three separate arbitrations brought under 
the ECT against Russia.84 In all three instances, the tribunal conferred its jurisdiction.85 The 
tribunal decided that invoking the “limitation clause” under Article 45(1) does not require 
express declaration under Article 45(2)(c) since there is no essential linkage between the two 
provisions, nor any other notification to that effect, and in principle, Russia can rely on 
Article 45(1). The key issue however, was whether the “provisional application” under 
Article 45(1) of the ECT should be interpreted as application of the entire treaty (“all or 
nothing” approach) or application of certain parts of the treaty only (“piecemeal” approach). 
In other words, the question was whether Russia applied ECT as a whole or whether it 
applied only these provisions that were consistent with its Russian Constitution, laws and 
regulations. The tribunal decided that “all or nothing” approach is the preferred route for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, such approach is more aligned with the requirement under Article 
31(1) of the VCLT to give an ordinary meaning to the treaty. Secondly, it is consistent with 
the existing case law on the matter, particularly Kardassopoulos case where the tribunal made 
it clear that “[w]here what is in issue is … the provisional application of the whole treaty, 
then such provisional application imports the application of all its provisions as if they were 
already in force...”.86 Thirdly, if the state’s intention was to apply only certain parts of the 
treaty this should have been made explicit from the outset. Fourthly, determining whether 
each and every provision of the treaty is consistent with domestic law would be against the 
object of the treaty and contrary to principles of international law, particularly pacta sunt 
servanda principle and Article 27 of the VCLT which prohibit states from invoking internal 
legislation as a justification for failure to perform the treaty obligations. Furthermore, 
combining international and domestic law should not be allowed, as this would cause great 
uncertainty and potential inconsistency. Fifthly, it is generally the practice that states are 
either in a position to apply the entire treaty provisionally or not at all. The Energy Charter 
Secretariat has kept track of the intentions of each signatory i.e. whether they wish to apply 
the treaty provisionally or avoid its application all together.87 
 
                                                            
82 Supra note, Niebruegge, at 359.  
83 The ECT has never been ratified by Russian State Duma. 
84 Hulley Enterprises Limited (Cyprus) (PCA Case No. AA 226); Yukos Universal Limited (Isle of Man) (PCA 
Case No. AA 227); Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) (PCA Case No. 228). 
85 Roux L., The Effect of the Yukos Case and Proceedings on the EU-Russia Energy Relationship, ESCP / 
Research Center for Energy Management, 25 February 2013, http://www.escpeurope.eu/nc/media-news/news-
newsletter/news-single/article/the-effect-of-the-yukos-case-and-proceedings-on-the-eu-russia-energy-
relationship/. Also see, Natural Gas Europe, The Impact of Yukos on the EU-Russia Energy Relationship, 01 
March 2013, 
http://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/impact-yukos-eu-russia-energy-relationship#axzz3KHD2cAUt.  
86 Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. The Republic of Georgia, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18, para. 219. 
87  Supra note 85, paras 244-329. 
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Once satisfied that the “all or nothing” approach is the correct one, the tribunal went on to 
consider the compatibility of the “provisional application” per se with with Russian 
Constitution, laws and regulations. It also addressed the compatibility of ECT’s dispute 
resolution provisions with the Russian Constitution, laws and regulations, which in essence 
goes against the “all or nothing” approach, however it expressly stated that “…there is no 
need, in principle, to address Respondent’s submission that the provisions of the ECT 
relating to dispute resolution are themselves inconsistent with Russian law...”. 88  Both 
questions were answered affirmatively. It was also noted that Russia “provisionally” applied 
other 45 international treaties at that time.89 
This result reassured investors that issues of provisional application would not pose any 
jurisdictional obstacles in bringing an arbitration claim against Russia under the ECT. 
However, the ECT offers no protection to any investments made after Russia’s termination of 
the provisional application and only the investments made prior to that termination is 
protected for the period of 20 years.90 It should also be noted that the ECT’s application is 
limited to energy related investments. Yet, it could be argued that since its inception in 1991, 
the ECT remains to be a significant legal instrument in terms of its trade liberalisation nature 
and the legal foundation, protection and predictability it instils.91 Key provisions of the ECT 
should be duplicated in BITs so that a degree of legal safeguards and remedial protection can 
be available to all parties involved. It is unfortunate that Russia has withdrawn from this legal 
framework which would have paved the way for energy security and thickening of rule of 
law in energy trade.  
3. Enforcement of arbitration awards in Russia 
Recognition and enforcement of a foreign court decision or arbitration award in Russia have 
never been an easy. Nevertheless, Article 241(1) of the RF Arbitrazh Procedure Code (APC) 
provides that “international treaties on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and 
federal law – with the corresponding effect – serve as two complementary legal bases for 
both recognition and enforcement”. Russia is a party to two main multilateral international 
treaties on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral tribunal judgments: the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958 and 
the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, 1961. Accordingly, 
arbitration awards must be recognised and enforced in Russia. Yet, the Supreme Arbitrazh 
Court (SAC) stated that “the absence of an international treaty [between Russia and Israel] 
renders recognition of a decision of foreign court impossible.”92 The same conclusion was 
reached in an earlier case (No. KG-A40/8581-05-P) whereby the Russian court had refused to 
recognise a decision of the Higher Regional Court of Berlin. Nevertheless, more recent 
Russian judicial decisions evidence that Article 241(1) of the APC is no longer imperative 
and there is a more open approach to the legal grounds for recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments in Russia. For example, in Boegli-Gravures (No. VAS-6580/12) the SAC 
                                                            
88 Supra note 85, paras 330-392. 
89 Nacimiento P. et al., Energy Charter Treaty Arbitration and the CIS Countries, (2014) The European, Middle 
Eastern and African Arbitration Review, 20; http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/files/energy-charter-treaty-
arbitration-108118.pdf.  
90 Article 45(3) of the ECT. Also see, Carlson M. F., et al., Russia withdrawing from Energy Charter Treaty, 03 
September 2009, http://uk.practicallaw.com/7-422-4842?service=dispute.  
91 Supra note, Konoplyanik A. and Wälde T, asserting that the ECT “is aimed at strengthening the rule of law, 
both internationally in relation between member states and investors, but also domestically by signaling ‘good 
governance’ in member states”, p. 532. 
92 The SAC Decision No. 5105/2008, 19 May 2008. 
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held that even if there is no international treaty in place, “recognition of an English court 
decision must be effected on the basis of the comity of nations and reciprocity principles.”93 
While the string of decisions after Boegli-Gravures signaled a new era in recognition and 
enforcement of arbitration awards in Russia, this was halted to certain degree by political 
developments. 
On the 6th February 2014 President Vladimir Putin signed a bill amending the Constitution 
and several other Bills, as a result of which the SAC94 ceased to exist on 7th August 2014.95 
Providing that the dispute could be arbitrated, the SAC was the main judicial authority for 
enforcing arbitration awards.96 This judicial reform took place despite the open opposition 
from legal practitioners and members of judiciary97 as well as negative reaction amongst 
businesses operating in Russia.98 The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation in charge of 
resolving civil, criminal and administrative disputes assumed the jurisdiction over 
commercial disputes that previously vested in the SAC. The Judicial Board, a division of the 
Supreme Court, has replaced the SAC for Economic Disputes. The Judicial Board has fewer 
                                                            
93 The following are some of the foreign judgments recognised by Russian courts: Judgments of the High Court 
of Justice of England and Wales, according to Decision of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of Moscow District, 
Number KG-A40/698-06- P, of 2 March 2006, regarding OAO Petroleum Company Yukos, according to 
Decision of the Arbitrazh Court of Bashkortostan, Number A07-16859/2013, of 17 March 2014, regarding VIS 
Trading Co Ltd. (upheld by the Ruling of the Supreme Court, Number 309-ES14-69, of 18 August 2014), as 
well as according to Decision of Moscow Arbitrazh Court, Number A40-153603/13, of 30 May 2014, regarding 
Kedart Finance Limited (upheld by the Ruling of the Supreme Court, Number 305-ES14-3869/09, of 29 October 
2014); of the District Court of the City of Dordrecht, the Netherlands, according to Decision of the Arbitrazh 
Court of Moscow Region, Number A41-9613/09, of 8 June 2009, regarding Rentpool B.V. (upheld by the 
Ruling of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, Number VAS-13688/09, of 7 December 2009); of the Patents Court of 
the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice of England and Wales according to the Decision of Moscow 
Arbitrazh Court, Number А40-119397/11-63-950, of 10 February 2012, regarding Boegli-Gravures S.A. 
(upheld by the Ruling of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, Number VAS-6580/12, of 26 July 2012); of the High 
Court of Justice in Northern Ireland according to the Decision of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, Number 
6004/13, of 8 October 2013, regarding Quinn Group; of the Commercial Court of Zurich according to Decision 
of the Federal Arbitrazh Court of North-Caucasian District, Number A15-1453/2012, of 14 March 2013, 
regarding Biscom AG (although the judgment was obviously mistakenly recognized and enforced with the 
reference to the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of 10 
June 1958, it was upheld by the Ruling of the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, Number VAS-4689/13, of 15 April 
2013). 
94 Supreme Arbitrahz Court is now the Supreme Arbitration (Commercial) Court of the Russian Federation; 
http://www.arbitr.ru/eng/sac/.  
95 For a full overview of the reforms please see: Dolotova M., ‘Reform of the judicial system of the Russian 
Federation’, 15 July 2014, http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bdfc22eb-68d1-40f3-bc5f-
53d63a6e8640.  
96  Arbitrazh (commercial) courts are comprised of four instances: first instance, appeal, cassation and 
'supervision'. They are organised on the principle of territoriality, coinciding with the administrative divisions of 
Russia. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction in the first instance generally covers one 
or several districts (raion), while the jurisdiction of the commercial courts starts from the regional (oblast) level. 
See, Khrenov & Partners, Russia – Trends & Developments, 2015, 
http://www.chambersandpartners.com/guide/practice-guides/location/241/6621/1403-199.  
97  Novosti R., ‘Russian Lawyers Protest Putin’s Court Reform’, 20 November 2013; 
(http://en.ria.ru/russia/20131120/184808408/Russian-Lawyers-Protest-Putins-Court-Reform.html).  




judges than in the original SAC as well as in other divisions of Supreme Court.99 This is 
likely to prolong commercial disputes in general. 
Supporters of the reforms argue that the new structure will promote greater efficiency and 
help to avoid contradictory judgments.100 It is argued that the changes were intended to create 
a “unified approach to dispute resolutions involving both individuals and legal entities, 
eliminate possible jurisdiction conflicts, establish general rules of judicial proceedings, and 
introduce consistency to Russian court practices”.101  However, others see the new regime as 
a weakening of the commercial court system which was more professional and less prone to 
political interference than any other civil and criminal court.102 In fact, the SAC developed a 
reputation as the most impartial court in Russia.103 Its judges had a particular experience and 
expertise in commercial matters and disputes. The SAC had been issuing guidelines and 
clarifications, which provided more certainty for national and international investors and 
were binding on the lower courts.104 It regularly published its important decisions in English. 
The SAC’s judges introduced most innovative reforms including an e-justice system that 
enabled parties to file documents online and increased transparency that comes with allowing 
anyone to review judgments and rulings in a searchable database (the Arbitration Case 
Directory).105 This e-justice system expedited the procedure and made tracking and publicity 
of the case easier. The SAC’s proactive policy-making and judicial activism have reached the 
point when on occasions it created precedence by implementing regulations that did not have 
legal grounding in national legislation, an unusual feature for a civil law system.106  
One of the most significant improvements introduced by the SAC was made in relation to 
arbitration.107 The NYC provides for a multiple grounds upon which the enforcement may be 
refused, inter alia invalidity of an arbitration agreement, insufficient notification of a party, 
non-arbitrability of a dispute, procedural defects and the most popular exemption clause – 
violation of public policy.108 The uncertainty clouding the application of the public policy 
                                                            
99  Klimov Y. and Markova N., ‘Russia: to innovate is not to reform’, April 2014, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/116672/www.cdr-news.co.uk.   
100 Supra note, Matthews and Konchits.   
101 Specht & Partner, ‘Abolishment of the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation: Goals and 
Prospects’, http://www.spechtboehm.com/rf-supreme-court/.  
102  Hille K., ‘Putin tightens grip on legal system’, Financial Times, 27 November 2013; 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a4209a42-5777-11e3-b615-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Dhl9JDrS.  
103  Balmforth T., Putin's Legal Vertical: Kremlin Seeks To Consolidate Court System, 09 October 2013, 
http://www.rferl.mobi/a/russia-judicial-reform-arbitration-court/25131950.html.  
104 Matthews S. and Konchits E., “Reform of Russian Supreme Court system – creation of an integrated 
Supreme Court”, http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/lrrfs/continental%20europe/Pages/Reform-of-
Russian-Supreme-Court-system-%E2%80%93-creation-of-an-integrated-Supreme-Court.aspx.   
105  Klimov Y. and Markova N., “Russia: to innovate is not to reform, April 2014, 
http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/116672/www.cdr-news.co.uk.   
106 “B2B: The Russian Judicial System: Reforms Continue”, Roman Zaitsev, The Moscow Times, 21 April 
2014, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/b2b-the-russian-judicial-system-reforms-
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grounds109 has been finally addressed in February 2013 by the SAC, which published the 
guidelines on the application of the power to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award 
on public policy grounds, suggesting a narrow interpretation. This change was expected to 
result in a greater number of awards being enforced in Russia.110 However, it is unclear 
whether this will materialise. The decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court has a power 
to amend every decision made by the SAC. Time will tell whether the progress made by the 
SAC will be reversed or further developed by the new Judicial Board.111  
As illustrated by the Fujitsu Technology112 and Bouygues Batiment cases113 – the Russian 
courts were becoming keener to enforce the awards, which were being opposed on some 
other grounds than public policy. In Fujitsu Technology the two objections were dismissed: a) 
the consent to arbitrate the dispute and b) the lack of signature. The court held that it is for the 
tribunal to decide on the scope of its own jurisdiction and that the lack of signature, since it 
had not been raised at the beginning of the proceedings, cannot be raised at the enforcement 
stage. In Bouygues Batiment the court confirmed that Russian courts were not prepared to 
interfere with the merits of the awards and that the application to set aside the award did not 
preclude its enforcement.114 These decisions are in line with international practice however, 
the Russian legal system does not operate on the principle of precedent and the recent legal 
reforms have not yielded any positive results hence the problem of legal certainty remains.  
 The recognition and enforcement of the awards containing “forum selection clause”115 have 
also become uncertain as a result of the SAC’s judgement in RTC v Sony Ericsson Mobile 
Communications.116 The SAC ruled on invalidity of such clauses and held that both lenders 
and borrowers have right to apply to their domestic courts to adjudicate the matter, 
effectively including Russian courts in the party’s choice. Nevertheless, this is balanced by 
the general Russian courts’ inclination to refer the dispute to arbitration even if the arbitration 
clause is somewhat ambiguous or does not expressly name the arbitration institution. 117 
These are sound examples of the Russian efforts to integrate into the international trade and 
investment regime. Yet, political interference either directly on investment projects118 and 
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111 Given the smaller number of judges in the Judicial Board and their lack of experience in commercial and 
investment disputes compared to the SAC, the recent reforms may result in increased timelines and greater 
uncertainty. 
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gas-export-policy-GPC-5.pdf. Also recall that “in September 2006, the Russian government revoked the Royal 
Dutch Shell (Shell) company license to manage the world’s biggest liquefied gas development in Sakhalin. Shell 
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 17 
arbitration awards, or indirectly by curtailing the power or jurisdiction of specialised courts, 
the rule of law and remedies in investment disputes and energy trade remain problematic in 
Russia.   
4. Conclusion and current developments 
 It is clear that the business and legal environment in Russia can present some serious risks 
for investors. In order to minimise any future legal uncertainty emerging from the lack of 
MFN status or other substantive procedural rights and remedies, parties to a BIT could adopt 
a mutual understanding protocol annexed to the BIT. After all, under public international law, 
it is accepted that protocols and annexes of a treaty form an integral part thereof. 119  
Furthermore, an agreement to amend BIT provisions or clarification as to the interpretation of 
its terms by a joint declaration can inform any future dispute settlement procedure including 
arbitration.120  
Adequate protection of investments is an essential building block of investor’s confidence. 
As discussed above, there are serious concerns that such protection may not meet the 
standards required by investors interested in investing in Russia. Non-arbitrability of the issue 
of expropriation in certain BITs, non-applicability of the MFN clause to dispute resolution 
provisions, limited applicability of the ECT, ineffective judicial reforms and uncertainty of 
the recognition and enforcement of awards in Russia, added together; do not present an 
inviting investment protection package to a potential investor nor ensure remedies for 
existing investors should a dispute arises. With the legal reforms in Russia still in a state of 
flux as well as the constant changes introduced by the government, numerous judicial organs 
are struggling to adjust and produce consistent decisions. For example, on 29 December 
2015, President Putin signed the Federal Law “On Arbitration in the Russian Federation” 
(FLA) and the Federal Law “On Changes to Certain Laws of the Russian Federation”. The 
FLA will come into force on 01 September 2016.121 These efforts are perhaps a sign that the 
government has acknowledged the need to improve the credibility of the dispute resolution 
mechanism in Russia. This should not, however, lead us to the conclusion that these changes 
are beyond criticism. For example, the new FLA requires that Russia shall be the mandatory 
seat of arbitrations related to disputes between shareholders of Russian legal entities 
irrespective of whether such parties are domiciled in Russia or not.122 Subsequently, foreign 
arbitral institutions will only qualify for administering Russian corporate disputes after they 
have acquired the necessary certification. It is not clear yet what this certification process 
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[1987] ECR 4199.  
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Vol. 1, Part II. http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1966_v1_p2_e.pdf.  
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entails in detail but for a foreign arbitral institution, the main criterion is the evidence of a 
widely recognised international reputation (FLA, Article 44, para. 8). A failure by a foreign 
arbitration institution to obtain a certificate would have great consequences for cases where 
Russia is the seat of arbitration. Such cases would be considered as ad hoc arbitration, not 
institutional arbitration (FLA, Article 44, para. 3) therefore foreign arbitral institutions 
without certification would not have jurisdiction in relation to corporate disputes regarding 
Russian companies. 
FLA also states that an arbitration agreement shall be part of a charter of a Russian company 
and shall be applicable to all shareholders. However, public corporations and corporations 
with more than 1000 shareholders are not allowed to enter into arbitration agreements.123 As 
these examples illustrate, Russia has a long way to go for ensuring investment disputes are 
settled effectively and in free market environment subject to the rule of law. In the mean 
time, any investor engaging with Russia would be advised to include an arbitration clause and 
arbitrate disputes in a foreign jurisdiction whenever possible.  
The concerns articulated above however are dwarfed by the risk posed by the ongoing crisis 
on Ukraine, and the trade war that Russia is engaged in with countries imposing 
countermeasures.124 The new wave of sanctions by the EU against Russia have gone into 
force, blocking loans for five big state banks and curbing EU business with oil and defense 
firms. These sanctions target not only individuals and companies but also particular sectors of 
the Russian economy.125 Three major Russian state oil firms are targeted: Rosneft, Transneft 
and Gazprom Neft, the oil unit of gas giant Gazprom. Their access to financial markets is 
restricted - a serious matter for Rosneft, which last August asked the Russian government for 
a $42bn (£25.2bn) loan.126 Big Russian state-owned banks are barred from getting loans with 
a maturity longer than one month, and from getting other financial services in the EU.127 
Following the sanctions imposed on Russia and nearly 40% fall in petrol prices since July 
2014, the Russian currency, ruble, fell to a new low against the US dollar and the euro.128 
With the early Russian initiatives of integration to international trade, not only the Russian 
export revenues have increased,129 but also Russia was becoming a major host for foreign 
direct investment (FDI). The Global Investment Trend Monitor published by UNCTAD, 
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indicated that for the first time in history Russia has become the third largest recipient of FDI. 
In 2013, FDI in Russia was at a record level, with an 83% increase since 2012. It was 
indicated that this unprecedented increase was caused by the British company BP acquiring a 
large stake in the Russian Rosneft, as part of the acquisition of TNK-BP by Rosneft.130 After 
stepping up 20 places in the 2014 Doing Business Report of the World Bank,131 Russia went 
up two more places in the 2015 Report, ranking as 62nd out of 189 economies.132 However, 
the new geopolitical tensions between Russia, Ukraine and the Western countries have 
reversed this positive trend and gave rise to numerous economic sanctions. As a consequence, 
FDI fell to a record low in 2014 and 2015. It is evident that the EU sanctions have been 
drafted carefully, in light of number of vulnerabilities the EU faces, including the dependence 
on Russian gas supply and nuclear technology. Accordingly, Russian gas exports, the space 
industry and nuclear energy have been given exemptions. In response, Russia banned EU 
food exports. While this ban hurts a number of EU Member States; it will also lead to 
increase in the cost of living in Russia.133  
These unfortunate events dent the prospect of building a successful investment regime in 
Russia. Once one adds the mixture of inherent shortcomings such as the uncertainty of 
interpretation and application of MFN status, calculation and enforcement of arbitration 
awards, and the limited protection and safeguards conferred by the ECT, it becomes more 
evident that the energy trade and investment with Russia are complex, full of risks and 
surprises. Hence, this can be called the Russian Roulette!  
 Put in a perspective, issues discussed in this article are subtle nuisances when compared with 
the fears of an armed intervention, loss of lives, trade sanctions and embargoes all of which 
are taking shape within geo-politics and subject of contest of wills. It is therefore difficult to 
predict what the near future will bring in terms of investment security, legal certainty and 
normalisation of trade relations with Russia. It is clear however that drop in oil and gas 
prices, lack of investment and economic sanctions have already taken their toll on the 
Russian FDI as it is expected to fall by nearly 50% from last year’s 59.7 billion euros to the 
expected 30 billion euros in 2014.134 The recent IMF Report (2016) indicates that overall 
Russian economic growth was in the negative135 and the projections for the coming years are 
not promising either,136 a fact which Russia had confirmed earlier.137 
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